In quotes: BHS inquiry slams Sir Philip Green, Chappell and advisers

Who is to blame?:

“One person, and one person alone, is ultimately responsible for the BHS disaster. While Sir Philip Green signposted blame for 11,000 job losses and a gigantic pension fund hole to every known player, the buck stops with him. His reputation as the king of retail lies in the ruins of BHS.”

“Sir Philip cut costs, sold assets and paid substantial dividends offshore to the ultimate benefit of his wife. We found little evidence to support the reputation for retail business acumen for which he received his knighthood.”

“We still do not doubt that Sir Philip has heartfelt affection for BHS. To an extent it created him; it could also bring him down.”

BHS pension scheme:

“Over the duration of [The Greens’] tenure, significantly more money left the company than was invested in it. The scale of the payments were proportionately far higher as a percentage of net profits than key competitors.”

“When Sir Philip Green bought BHS, the pension schemes…were in surplus. As these schemes declined into substantial and unsustainable deficit he and his directors repeatedly resisted requests from trustees for higher contributions. That there is a massive deficit is ultimately Sir Philip Green’s responsibility.”

“Sir Philip owes it to the BHS pensioners to find a resolution urgently. This will undoubtedly require him to make a large financial contribution. He has a moral duty to act.”

“Dominic Chappell and the directors of RAL [Retail Acquisitions Limited] should not be absolved of blame. They accepted responsibility for it with a negligent and cavalier disregard for the risks and potential consequences. RAL directors should not escape regulatory investigation.”

The sale of BHS:

“Sir Philip Green drove the deal forward. He sought to sell a chain that had become a financial millstone and threatened his reputation. He knew that Dominic Chappell was a wholly unsuitable purchaser but overlooked or made good each of Chappell’s shortcomings and proceeded with a rushed sale regardless.”

“£25 million of working capital was arranged by Sir Philip Green and guaranteed by Arcadia. He was both sides of the deal.”

The role of advisers:

“The sale of BHS did not have to proceed as it did. The potential checks, however, proved to be inadequate. Regulatory concerns were circumvented. Advisers were heavily incentivised to progress the deal.”

“Grant Thornton and Olswang were increasingly aware of RAL’s manifold weaknesses as purchasers of BHS. They were nonetheless content to take generous fees and lend both their names and their reputations to the deal.”

“Sir Philip and [Arcadia finance director] Paul Budge cannot pass responsibility for going ahead with the deal to Goldman Sachs. Arcadia failed to follow up adequately concerns expressed about Mr Chappell or the deal.”

Dominic Chappell and RAL:

“RAL board members exploited BHS for their personal gain and Dominic Chappell was the worst culprit. Even when arranging loans for their struggling company on extraordinary terms they could not resist taking a substantial cut for themselves.”

“Dominic Chappell was out of his depth. He was over-optimistic to the point of arrogance.”

“Chappell has referred to the rewards for risk that are the foundations of entrepreneurship, but he was taking no risks. The rewards that he took, on the other hand, were lavish. In effect, he had his hands in the till.”

BHS’ corporate governance:

“We saw meagre evidence of the type of constructive challenge that a good board should provide.”

“The complacent performance of Lord Grabiner as the non-executive chairman represented the apogee of weak corporate governance.”

“He [Lord Grabiner] was content to provide a veneer of establishment credibility to the group while happily disengaging from the key decisions he had a responsibility to scrutinise. For this deplorable performance he received a considerable salary.”